Optimal Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy with Incomplete Markets and Interest Rate Shocks by Josué Fernando Cortés Espada
Banco de M´ exico
Documentos de Investigaci´ on
Banco de M´ exico
Working Papers
N◦ 2006-09
Optimal Fiscal Policy in a Small Open
Economy with Incomplete Markets and
Interest Rate Shocks
Josu´ e Fernando Cort´ es Espada
Banco de M´ exico
September 2006
La serie de Documentos de Investigaci´ on del Banco de M´ exico divulga resultados preliminares de
trabajos de investigaci´ on econ´ omica realizados en el Banco de M´ exico con la ﬁnalidad de propiciar
el intercambio y debate de ideas. El contenido de los Documentos de Investigaci´ on, as´ ı como las
conclusiones que de ellos se derivan, son responsabilidad exclusiva de los autores y no reﬂejan
necesariamente las del Banco de M´ exico.
The Working Papers series of Banco de M´ exico disseminates preliminary results of economic
research conducted at Banco de M´ exico in order to promote the exchange and debate of ideas. The
views and conclusions presented in the Working Papers are exclusively the responsibility of the
authors and do not necessarily reﬂect those of Banco de M´ exico.Documento de Investigaci´ on Working Paper
2006-09 2006-09
Optimal Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy with
Incomplete Markets and Interest Rate Shocks1
Josu´ e Fernando Cort´ es Espada 2
Banco de M´ exico
Abstract
This paper studies optimal ﬁscal policy in a small open economy model under incomplete
ﬁnancial markets, where interest rates, government spending and productivity are stochastic
and taxes are distortionary. The contributions of the paper are twofold. First, I solve the
Ramsey problem and characterize the properties of the optimal ﬁscal policy. Second, I show
that the optimal ﬁscal policy consists in smoothing tax distortions over time. The income
tax rate and specially the public debt are very persistent irrespective of the degree of auto-
correlation of the assumed processes for the shocks generating aggregate ﬂuctuations. The
government ﬁnances an increase in government spending or a decrease in the tax base partly
by increasing debt and partly by increasing the tax rate. This reﬂects the government’s desire
to smooth the cost of raising taxes over time.
Keywords: optimal ﬁscal policy, taxation, incomplete markets, debt policy.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E60, F34, F41, H21
Resumen
Este art´ ıculo estudia la pol´ ıtica ﬁscal ´ optima en un modelo de equilibrio general para una
econom´ ıa peque˜ na y abierta con mercados ﬁnancieros incompletos, donde la tasa de inter´ es,
el gasto p´ ublico y la productividad son variables estoc´ asticas y los impuestos son distorsivos.
Las principales contribuciones del presente art´ ıculo son dos. Primero, se resuelve el problema
de Ramsey y se caracterizan cuantitativamente las propiedades de la pol´ ıtica ﬁscal ´ optima.
Segundo, se muestra que la pol´ ıtica ﬁscal ´ optima consiste en suavizar las distorsiones impo-
sitivas a trav´ es del tiempo. La tasa impositiva, y especialmente la deuda p´ ublica, son muy
persistentes independientemente del grado de autocorrelaci´ on de los choques que generan
las ﬂuctuaciones en la econom´ ıa. El gobierno ﬁnancia un incremento en el gasto p´ ublico o
una ca´ ıda en la base impositiva en parte mediante un incremento en la deuda p´ ublica y en
parte mediante un incremento en la tasa impositiva, lo cual reﬂeja el deseo del gobierno de
suavizar a trav´ es del tiempo el costo de incrementar la tasa impositiva.
Palabras Clave: pol´ ıtica ﬁscal ´ optima, impuestos, mercados incompletos, pol´ ıtica de deuda.
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1 Introduction 
In this paper, I analyze the properties of optimal fiscal policy in a small open economy where 
interest rates, government spending and productivity are stochastic, taxes are distortionary 
and markets are incomplete. This paper provides a new framework to analyze optimal fiscal 
policy in small open emerging economies. The present paper also contributes to the literature 
on optimal fiscal policy by studying the case of incomplete markets in a small open economy 
under uncertainty and distortionary taxation.  
 
Small open emerging economies typically face frequent and large fluctuations in interest 
rates, productivity and government spending. These economies differ from small open 
developed economies in several aspects: For example, output and consumption volatilities 
are higher in emerging economies than in developed economies. Also, as pointed out by 
Neumeyer and Perri (2005), interest rates are countercyclical in these economies, while in 
developed economies interest rates are acyclical. 
 
In particular, it is important to answer the following questions: What are the properties of 
optimal fiscal policy in a small open emerging economy under incomplete markets and 
distortionary taxation? How should the tax rate and the level of public debt adjust to an 
innovation in government spending or productivity in a small open economy?  How should 
the tax rate and the level of public debt adjust to an innovation in the interest rate in a small 
open economy? In this paper, I analyze these questions using a stochastic dynamic general 
equilibrium model of a small open  economy with incomplete markets. 
 
I consider it is important to answer these questions, because, in my view, a model with 
incomplete markets captures better the financial environment faced by emerging economies 
than the complete markets models, because even though emerging economies may have 
perfect access to international financial markets, they can not borrow contingent on the state 
of nature as the complete markets models assume. Developed countries have access to a 
richer menu of financial assets than developing countries, and as shown by Angeletos (2002) 
and Buera and Nicolini (2002) governments can use the maturity structure of non-contingent 
public debt to replicate the complete markets optimal allocation as long as they have access 
to a sufficiently rich maturity structure. 
 
Therefore, in this paper I solve the optimal fiscal policy problem for a small open economy 
under incomplete markets and distortionary taxation. In the case of complete markets, any 
tax schedule can be implemented as long as it satisfies the economy’s resource constraints 
and as long as it can be sustained by a competitive equilibrium. When markets are 
incomplete, only a subset of the complete markets policies is available to the government. 
This introduces additional constraints on the set of competitive equilibrium allocations that 
the government can choose from, which makes the problem computationally more difficult.  
 
In the model economy there are three agents, households, firms and a government. 
Households value leisure and consumption. Firms produce final goods using labor as the only 
input in production. In addition, firms have to pay for part of the wage bill before production 2 
takes place creating a need for working capital as in Neumeyer and Perri (2005)
3. The 
government finances an exogenous and stochastic sequence of unproductive public 
consumption by issuing debt and by levying income taxes. The only taxes available to the 
government are proportional income taxes, which distort the consumption-leisure margin. All 
the agents in the economy have access to international financial markets, where they can 
borrow or lend to foreigners. Financial markets are incomplete because agents can only buy 
and sell one-period non-contingent real bonds. Moreover, I assume that agents can commit to 
repay their debt. The model economy is subject to three types of shocks: productivity shocks, 
interest rate shocks and government spending shocks.  
 
I follow the Ramsey approach in characterizing the optimal fiscal policy. In this approach the 
Ramsey planner chooses an allocation that maximizes the household’s utility subject to the 
condition that this allocation be implementable as a competitive equilibrium. In addition, I 
assume that the Ramsey planner commits to the announced policies.  
 
The contributions of the paper are twofold. First, I solve the Ramsey problem for a small 
open economy with incomplete markets and stochastic interest rates, government spending 
and productivity. When markets are incomplete, as I have already mentioned, only a subset 
of the complete markets policies is available to the planner. This introduces into the Ramsey 
problem  additional implementability constraints that arise from the requirement that the debt 
be risk-free. Since conditional expectations of future variables appear in these 
implementability constraints, the Ramsey problem is not recursive. Nevertheless, I show it is 
possible to recover a recursive formulation using the recursive contracts approach of Marcet 
and Marimon (1998). After setting up the Ramsey problem recursively, I compute the 
optimal policy by solving a log-linear approximation to the Ramsey planner’s optimality 
conditions. 
 
Second, I find that the optimal fiscal policy consists in smoothing tax distortions over time. 
The income tax rate, and specially the public debt are very persistent irrespective of the 
degree of autocorrelation of the assumed processes for the shocks generating aggregate 
fluctuations. This reflects the planner’s desire to smooth the cost of raising taxes over time.  
 
The Ramsey planner finances an increase in government spending or a decrease in the tax 
base partly by increasing debt and partly by increasing the tax rate. In order to avoid a large 
distortion at the time of the shock, the planner smoothes the tax increase over time. As a 
consequence, the stock of public debt displays a persistent increase. Debt plays in this model 
an important role as a shock absorber. After a positive innovation in the interest rate or in 
government spending, or after negative innovation in productivity, the level of public debt 
and the primary deficit increase. Government debt responds on impact less than the other 
variables, but it accumulates over time, and displays the most persistent impulse response 
function. The responses of debt and the primary deficit have the same sign in the first 
periods. However, the response of the primary deficit changes sign after a few periods, 
                                                 
3 Neumeyer and Perri (2005) introduced the working capital assumption in order to generate a transmission 
mechanism by which interest rates affect output. 3 
because a higher debt interest will have to be serviced in the future in response to an increase 
in debt today. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the literature on optimal fiscal 
policy. Section 3 presents the economic environment and the theoretical model. Section 4 
presents the Ramsey problem, and develops a recursive representation. Section 5 describes 
the calibration of the model and analyzes the quantitative results to illustrate the dynamic 
properties of the optimal fiscal policy. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Related Literature 
 
This paper is related to several studies about optimal fiscal policy. An extensive literature on 
optimal fiscal policy has emerged since the seminal work of Lucas and Stokey (1983). Most 
of the existing work, however has limited attention to closed economy environments. This 
paper instead studies optimal fiscal policy  in a small open economy with incomplete 
markets. The two key elements that distinguish my analysis from the pertinent literature are 
the following: First, I consider a small open economy where the agents can only buy or sell 
risk-free debt. Second, I introduce stochastic interest rates to analyze how interest rates 
shocks affect the properties of the optimal fiscal policy. 
 
In a closed economy environment with complete markets, Lucas and Stokey (1983) used the 
Ramsey approach of optimal taxation to study the properties of optimal fiscal policy. They 
found that it is optimal to respond to fiscal shocks by appropriately altering the state-
contingent return on government debt and keeping the tax rate roughly constant, so state-
contingent debt serves as an instrument to smooth tax distortions over time and states of 
nature. They also show that tax rates and debt inherit the serial correlation structure of the 
underlying shocks. Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994) analyzed the quantitative features of 
optimal fiscal policy in a standard real business cycle model with complete markets as in 
Lucas and Stokey (1983). They showed that another way to keep tax rates stable over the 
business cycle is to have non-state contingent debt with taxes on interest income that vary 
with the shocks, in this case state-contingent taxes on interest income should be used to 
provide insurance against adverse shocks. They found that in calibrated models to the U.S., 
the standard deviation of optimal income taxes is close to zero while taxes on interest income 
are highly volatile and serially uncorrelated.  
 
Aiyagari et al (2002) restricted the government to issue only one-period non-contingent 
debt
4. They showed that optimal fiscal policy under this environment imposes a near random 
walk behavior on taxes and debt irrespective of the degree of autocorrelation of the 
underlying shocks. They also found that the level of debt permanently increases after a fiscal 
shock, and that the response of the tax rate is a weighted average of a random walk and a 
                                                 
4 Aiyagari et al (2002) modify Lucas and Stokey’s economy to restrict the government to issue only one-period 
real non-contingent debt. 4 




Angeletos (2002), and Buera and Nicolini (2002) considered governments restricted to 
trading non-contingent real debt of different maturities. They showed that governments could 
use the maturity structure of non-contingent public debt to replicate the complete markets 
optimal allocation. However, Buera and Nicolini showed that the government might need to 
take extremely large long and short positions in debt of different maturities. Since all of the 
above papers study the properties of optimal fiscal policy in closed economies, they do not 
consider interest rate shocks. 
 
In an open economy setting, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003b) study the properties of 
optimal policy in a monetary small open economy in which agents have access to complete 
international asset markets. They show that in a small open economy under complete markets 
optimal tax rates do not change in response to government spending shocks while in a closed 
economy they do. Riascos and Vegh (2004) consider an environment in which government 
spending is determined endogenously. They show that when markets are complete, the 
correlation between government consumption and output is zero. However, if markets are 
incomplete the correlation between government consumption and output is large and 
positive.  
 
In terms of the existing literature, this paper is closest to Riascos and Vegh (2004). Like 
them, I study optimal fiscal policy in a small open economy. However, this paper differs in 
three key respects from their paper. First, the goal of the present paper is to characterize the 
behavior of  optimal tax rates and government debt under incomplete markets in a small open 
economy, while the goal of Riascos and Vegh (2004) is to analyze the procyclicality of fiscal 
policy in developing countries, so they do not analyze the optimal behavior of public debt 
under incomplete markets. Second, these authors consider an endowment economy, while I 
consider a production economy with an elastic labor supply, so movements in the tax rate 
affect the labor supply and output. Third, they develop a model in which the interest rate is 
constant, while I build a model in which the interest rate is stochastic to study how interest 
rate shocks affect the properties of the optimal fiscal policy. 
 
Optimal fiscal policy models for small open economies have not incorporated interest rate 
uncertainty, distortionary taxation and market incompleteness into a single framework. 
Previous papers either assume that agents have access to complete international asset markets 
or that interest rates are constant. In this paper, I solve the Ramsey problem for a small open 
economy under interest rate uncertainty, distortionary taxation and market incompleteness. 
Finally, by combining these elements in a general equilibrium model, I am able to 
characterize the properties of optimal fiscal policy in this environment, on the basis of 
Ramsey’s principle for optimal taxation.    
 
                                                 
5 Robert Barro (1979) hypothesized that government debt and tax rates should follow random walks, regardless 
of the serial correlations of the shocks that hit the economy. 5 
3. The Model 
 
Consider a small open economy with three agents, households, firms and a government, 
where the only asset traded in international financial markets is a one period real discount 
bond. Markets are incomplete because agents can only lend and borrow issuing and buying 
non contingent one period real discount bonds.  
 
Households derive utility from consumption and leisure. Firms produce goods using labor as 
the only input. In addition, firms have to pay for part of the wage bill before production takes 
place creating a need for working capital as in Neumeyer and Perri (2005). The government 
finances an exogenous stochastic sequence of unproductive consumption by issuing non 
contingent debt and by levying income taxes at the rate t τ .  
 
In each period, the economy experiences one of many events t s . We denote by  ( ) t
t s s s ,...., 0 =  
the history of events up to and including period t. The probability, as of period 0, of any 
particular history 
t s  is  ( )
t s µ . The initial realization  0 s  is given. The model economy is 
subject to three shocks: productivity shocks  ( )
t s z , interest rate shocks  ( )
t s R  and government 
spending shocks  ( )
t s g . It is assumed that the shocks are independent in order to isolate the 
effects of each shock, and that each shock follows an AR(1) process. 
 
 
(1) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 log log





t s s z s z ε ρ  
 
(2)  ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 log log





t s s R s R ε ρ  
 
(3)  ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 log log





t s s g s g ε ρ  
 
 
where  ( ) ( )
t t s R s q / 1 =   denotes the price of a bond that pays one unit of consumption next 
period in every state, and  ( )
t s R  denotes the gross interest rate. 





There is a representative household with preferences given by the following utility function: 
 
(4)  ()() () ( )
t t t
t s








where  () 1 , 0 ∈ β  denotes the subjective discount factor. Households derive utility from 
consumption and leisure. Let  ( )
t s c  denote consumption, and  ( )
t s h  hours worked. The single 
period utility function is assumed to be increasing in consumption, decreasing in hours, 
strictly concave, and twice continuously differentiable. 
 
Each period, the representative household supplies labor in a competitive labor market, 
receives wage income net of  taxes, profit income net of taxes from the ownership of firms, 
and issues one-period non-contingent real discount bonds. The household spends its income 
on consumption, debt repayment, and on the cost of adjusting its debt portfolio
6.  
 
The household’s budget constraint is then given by 
 
 
(5)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t t t t t t t t t t s s s h s w s s d s q s d s d s c Π − + − + ≤ + +




for all t, 
t s . 
 
where  ( )
t s τ  denotes the tax rate,  ( )
t s w  denotes the wage rate,  ( )
t s Π denotes profits,  ( )
t s d  
denotes debt issued by the household, and  ( ) ( )
t s d ψ  denotes adjustment costs on debt, where 
() . ψ  is a convex function. 
 
In addition to this budget constraint, the household is subject to the following no-Ponzi-game 
condition: 
 








j s d s q
τ
τ
  for all t,
t s . 
 
The assumptions on the utility function imply that the household will always choose state-
contingent sequences such that constraints (5) and (6) hold with equality.  
 
The household’s problem is then to choose state-contingent sequences of consumption, hours 
and debt that maximize the expected lifetime utility (4) subject to the sequence of budget 
constraints (5), and the no-Ponzi-game constraints (6), for a given initial value of debt, and 
for the given sequences of wage rates, taxes, bond prices and profits. 
 
The first order conditions associated with the household’s maximization problem are (5) and 
(6) holding with equality for all t, 
t s , and: 
 
 
                                                 
6 Adjustment costs on debt are introduced to guarantee that the equilibrium solution of the model is stationary. 
See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003a) for the different methods to induce stationarity including this one. 7 
(7)  ()





h s w s
s u
s u
τ − = − 1   for all t, 
t s  
 
where  ( )
t
c s u  denotes the derivative of the utility function with respect to consumption, and 
( )
t
h s u  denotes the derivative of the utility function with respect to hours. 
 
First-order condition (7) shows that the tax rate introduces a wedge between the 
consumption-leisure marginal rate of substitution and the wage rate. For a given wage rate, 
the representative household will tend to work less the higher is the tax rate. 
 
 












= ′ − µ β ψ    for all t, 
t s  
 
First-order condition (8) shows that if the representative household chooses to issue an 
additional unit of debt, then today’s consumption increases by  ( )
t s q  minus the marginal debt 
adjustment cost. The expression on the left of (8) represents the utility value of this increase 
in consumption. Next period, the household must deliver the promised unit of consumption. 
The expression on the right of (8) represents the utility value of this repayment in terms of 
today’s utility. At the optimum, the marginal benefit of an additional unit of debt must equal 
its marginal cost.  
 
 
3.2 Firms  
 
Firms are identical, perfectly competitive in input and goods markets and produce the final 
good using labor as the only input. At the beginning of the period firms hire labor to produce 
a final good  ( )
t s y  that will become available at the end of the period.  
 
Firms have to pay a fraction of the wage bill at the beginning of the period. However, they 
have no resources to do it because production becomes available only at the end of the 
period. Therefore, firms have to  borrow in the financial markets at the rate  ( )
t s R .  
 
The timing of the representative firm is as follows: first it observes the realization of the 
state, then it decides how much to produce and requests the working capital loan to hire 
labor. At the end of the period, when output becomes available, firms repay the working 
capital loan plus interest. 
 
Firms produce the final good using a concave technology. 
 
 
(9)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t t t s h f s z s y =   8 
 
 
where  ( )
t s y  denotes output, and  ( )
t s z  is an exogenous and stochastic productivity shock. 
 
Given the prices  ( ) ( )
t t s R s w , , the firm’s problem is to choose labor  ( )




() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) { }
t t t t t
s h
s h s w s R s h f s z
t 1 1 max − + − θ  
 
where  () . f  is strictly increasing, strictly concave and homogeneous of degree  1 ≤ η , θ  is 






=   is the gross 
interest rate.  
 
The first order condition associated with the firm’s maximization problem for all t, 
t s   is: 
 
 
(10)  () ( ) ( ) ( )






s h f s z
s w
θ
    
 
 
First-order condition (10) shows that the need for working capital to finance the wage bill 
makes the demand for labor sensitive to the interest rate. Since firms have to borrow to pay 
for labor, an increase in the interest rate makes the effective labor cost higher, so the firm’s 
labor demand falls for any given real wage. 
 
 
3.3 The Government  
 
The government faces a sequence of public consumption denoted by ( )
t s g , which is 
exogenous, stochastic and unproductive. The government has access to international financial 
markets where it can lend and borrow only in the form of one-period real non-contingent 
discount bonds. Government spending is financed by taxing income, and by issuing one-
period risk-free debt denoted by  ( )
t s b . 
 
Each period, the government collects taxes on wage and profit income, and issues new debt. 
The government uses its income to pay for government expenditures, last period debt, and 
adjustment costs on its debt portfolio. The government’s budget constraint is then given by 
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(11)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t t t t t t t t t t s s s h s w s s b s q s b s b s g Π + + ≤ + +
− τ τ ψ
1     
 
 for all t, 
t s  
 
 
where  ( ) ( )
t s b ψ  denotes adjustment costs on government’s debt, and  () . ψ  is a convex 
function.  
 
The government is also subject to a no-Ponzi-game condition of the form: 
 
 








j s b s q
τ
τ
      for all t, 
t s . 
 
This constraint is a requirement for the existence of a well defined Ramsey equilibrium. The 
no-Ponzi game constraint cannot be ignored because without it the first best allocation is 
feasible. A benevolent government seeking to maximize the welfare of private agents will 
always choose state-contingent allocations such that (12) holds with  equality. The fiscal 
policy consists in the announcement of a state-contingent sequence for the tax rate  ( ) {}
∞
=0 t
t s τ . 
 
 
3.4 Competitive Equilibrium 
 
Given initial conditions  1 1, − − b d , and exogenous stochastic processes ()()() { }
∞
=0 , , t
t t t s z s g s R , an 
equilibrium is a state-contingent sequence of allocations  ( ) ( )()() { }
∞
=0 , , , t
t t t t s b s d s h s c , a state-
contingent sequence of prices  ( ) { }
∞
=0 t




t s τ  such that: 
 
 




(ii)  Markets for factor inputs and goods clear. 
 
 
(iii)  The government satisfies its budget constraint. 
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Since this is a small open economy, the household’s debt position  ( )
1 − t s d , plus the 
government’s debt position  ( )
1 − t s b , and the working capital debt  () () ( )










represent the country’s foreign debt position in period t.  
 
 
Let  ( )
t s TB  denote the trade balance, where 
 
 
(13)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t t t t t t s b s d s g s c s y s TB ψ ψ − − − − = ) (  
 
 
The evolution of the country’s foreign debt position is then given by 
 
 
(14)   ()() () ( )()() ( ) ( )




t t t t t s TB s y
s R
s R
s b s d s b s d s q −
− +
−





1 1 1  
 
 
where   () ()
() () () () () ( ) ( )
t t t t
t
t











θ  represent the interests paid by firms on  
 
their working capital. 
 
 
Finally, profits are given by 
 
 
(15)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )() η − = Π 1
t t t s h f s z s  
 
 
4 Ramsey Problem 
 
I follow the Ramsey approach in characterizing the optimal fiscal policy. In this approach, 
the Ramsey planner chooses an allocation that maximizes the household’s utility subject to 
the condition that this allocation be implementable as a competitive equilibrium. Moreover, I 
assume that the Ramsey planner commits to the announced policies. To simplify the analysis 
of optimal fiscal policy, I adopt the approach of characterizing the equilibrium in primal 
form. This involves recasting all the prices and policy instruments in terms of allocations. 
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4.1 Primal Form of the Competitive equilibrium 
 
 
The following proposition presents the primal form of the competitive equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 1: Given initial conditions  1 1, − − b d , and exogenous stochastic processes for  
()()() {}
∞
=0 , , t
t t t s z s g s R , state-contingent plans  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { }
∞
=0 , , , t
t t t t s b s d s h s c  satisfy (6), (8), 
(12) and: 
  
(16)   () ( ) () () ( ) ( )( )


















h t t t t t s R s h
s u
s u
s d s q s d s d s c  
 
(17) 
()() () () ( ) ( ) () () () ()
( ) ( ) () () () () ( ) ()
t t t t t t
t
t t t t t
s b s d s g s c s b s d
s R















− − 1 1
1
1 1  
 
 
if and only if they satisfy (5), (7), (10), (11), (15), (6), (8), (12). 
 
 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
 
The Ramsey problem then consists in maximizing (4) subject to the sequence of  constraints 
(6), (8), (12), (16) and (17), taking as given  1 1, − − b d . 
 








s b s d
s h s c
s s h s c u
t
t t
























= ′ − µ β ψ  
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(16)  () ( ) () () ( ) ( )( )


















h t t t t t s R s h
s u
s u
s d s q s d s d s c  
 
 
(17)   ()() () () ( ) ( ) () () () ()()()
() () () () ( ) ()
t t t t
t t
t
t t t t t
s b s d s g s c
s b s d
s R















− − 1 1 1
1 1  
 
 




t s  
 
 
1 1, − − b d   given 
 
 
The constraints specified above can be classified in three groups. (6) and (12) are the no-
Ponzi game constraints, (16), (17) are predetermined equations because they include 
variables known at time t. Finally (8) is an expectational equation, because it contains a 
conditional expectation of future variables based on information at  t, 
t s . 
 
Since implementability constraint (8) of the Ramsey problem involves a conditional 
expectation of future control variables, the usual Bellman equation is not satisfied, so the 
optimal choice at time t is not a time invariant function of the state variables 
{} t t t t t R g z b d , , , , 1 1 − −  as in standard dynamic programming, and the whole history of shocks 
can matter for today’s optimal decision.  
 
Nevertheless, Marcet and Marimon (1998) show that when the original maximization 
problem is not recursive because implementability constraints depend on plans for future 
variables, an equivalent recursive saddle point problem can be constructed leading to a 
recursive formulation. The resulting saddle point problem expands the state space by 
including new state variables  that summarize the evolution of the lagrange multipliers of the 
original problem. 
 
To solve the Ramsey problem, we need to write the problem in a recursive framework. To 
this end, I follow Marcet and Marimon’s approach. The first step in this approach is to 




The corresponding Lagrangian is  
 
 




































s s s u s d s q s u s s h s c u s µ β ψ γ µ β
 
 
subject to (6), (12), (16), (17),   1 1, − − b d   given, where  ( ) ( )
t t t s s γ µ β  is the Lagrange multiplier 
of (8) at  t,
t s . This is still not a recursive problem, since future variables are present in the 
return function Γ. However, using the law of iterated expectations and reordering terms, one 
can show that the function H defined as  
 
 
() ()() ( ) ()()() () () [] ()() {} ∑∑
∞
=












t t t t
s
t s u s s d s q s u s s h s c u s H
t
ς ψ γ µ β  
 
 
( ) ( )
t t s s γ ς =
+1   for all  0 ≥ t ,  and  0 0 = ς     
 
 
is such that, for all feasible sequences Γ =H. 
 
 
Therefore, any solution to the original Ramsey problem must also be a solution to the 
following saddle point problem  
 
()()() () ()() ( ) ()()() () () [] ()() {} ∑∑
∞
=














t t t t
s
t
s h s c s
s u s s d s q s u s s h s c u s H
t







( ) ( )
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Here  ( )
t s ς  acts as a co-state variable. Notice that this saddle point problem does not have 
any future variables in the constraints and that all the functions in the constraints are known. 
If  we include  ( )
t s ς  in the set of state variables, the problem becomes recursive.  
 
 
This saddle point problem has a recursive formulation, in the sense that there exists a unique 
value function  () s b d W , , , ς  satisfying   
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Let χ  be the policy function of this saddle point functional equation, where  
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The solution to this functional equation yields a stationary policy function χ , so that the 
optimal solution to the Ramsey problem satisfies ( )( ) t t t t t t t t t s b d b d h c , , , , , , , 1 1 ς χ γ − − =  for 
all t and  0 0 = ς .  
 
This uniquely defines  stationary policies for the tax rate  t τ  and the wage rate  t w  from (7) 
and (10). The solution is recursive since only the values ( ) t t t t s b d , , , 1 1 ς − −  are relevant from 
past history and the policy function χ  is time invariant. 
Dependence of the optimal solution on ς  is the reason that the model is not recursive in the 
standard sense of having a time-invariant policy function of  { } t t t s b d , , 1 1 − − . 
 
The Lagrangian associated with the Ramsey problem, after substituting  1 − = t t γ ς into the 
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tλ β , and  t
tφ β  are the Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints (16) and (17) 
respectively 
 
The first-order conditions that characterize the optimal policy are shown in the Appendix. 
Since the optimality conditions of the Ramsey problem cannot be solved analytically, I 
compute the equilibrium dynamics by solving a log-linear approximation to the Ramsey 
planner’s optimality conditions. 
 
 
5 Dynamic Properties of the Optimal Policy. 
 
In this section, I carry out some simulations to study the dynamic properties of the model 
economy under the Ramsey policy with incomplete markets. I compute the equilibrium 
dynamics by solving a log-linear approximation to the Ramsey planner’s optimality 
conditions. First, I present the baseline calibration of the model. Second, I show and discuss 
the impulse responses of the model to the different shocks that hit the economy to illustrate 
the dynamic properties of the optimal fiscal policy. Third, I present and analyze the second 
moments of the simulated time series. Finally, I conduct a sensitivity analysis to evaluate 




The benchmark model is calibrated so as to make it consistent with some of the empirical 
regularities that reflect the structure of a typical emerging economy. In particular, data from 
Mexico is used to calibrate the parameters of the benchmark model. The data considered 
corresponds to quarterly observations for the period 1980-2004. In general the results are 
robust to changes in the parameters, therefore, I only report sensitivity analyses for those 
parameters that are crucial for determining the effects of the shocks in the model economy.  17 
The time endowment, which can be divided between labor and leisure is normalized to 1. 
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The parameter σ , the coefficient of relative risk aversion, is set equal to 2, a value that is 
standard in the literature. The parameter ν  is set to 1.6 following Neumeyer and Perri 




.  I set ϕ  to 
match an average time spent working of 20% of total time, which is a standard value. I set β  
to match an average real interest rate in Mexico of 10.17% per year.
8 
 
 I specify the following production function  
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I choose a value for η  consistent with a labor share of income of 0.67, a standard value. The 
labor’s share of income in the model is equal to  () 1 1 − + R θ
η
 and R  is the average gross 
interest rate. It is also assumed that all the wage bill is paid in advance, and therefore, I set 






                                                 
7 This specification has the property that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is 
independent of consumption. Therefore, labor supply is not affected by  consumption. 
8 Average real interest rate in Mexico from 1994 to 2002. See Neumeyer and Perri (2005). 18 
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where ψ  is a constant determining the size of the debt holding costs and  b d,  are the steady 
state values of  the household debt and government debt respectively. The parameter ψ  is 
chosen so that the costs are minimal and do not affect the short-run properties of the model. 
Therefore, ψ  is set to the minimum value that guarantees that the equilibrium solution is 
stationary. 
 
The steady state debt of the government in the model is not uniquely determined by the 
parameters of the model, so I set b to match the average public-debt to GDP ratio in Mexico 
for 1980-2004, which in the data is 37.5%.
9 I set d  to match the average of the ratio between 
the net debt foreign position and output in Mexico, which in the data is approximately equal 



























I choose a value forg  consistent with the average share of government spending in output in 
Mexico for 1980-2004, which in the data is approximately equal to 13.5% .
11 
 
                                                 
9 Source “Deuda Económica Amplia del Sector Público: Banco de México” 
10 The average net foreign position of  Mexico is computed by averaging foreign asset positions data, 
constructed using cumulated capital flows, from 1983 to 1998, as reported in Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2001). 
11 Source: INEGI 19 
It is assumed that the exogenous processes for productivity, interest rates and government 
expenditures follow independent AR(1) processes. First, I remove a linear trend from the 
variables. Then, I  estimate the parameters of the stochastic processes by OLS. 
The parameters of the benchmark model are shown in the following table. 
 
 
Table 1: Parameter Values 
 
Parameter Value 
β  0.9761 
σ  2 
ν  1.6 
ϕ  1.4367 
η  0.68 
ψ  0.0008 
ρ
z  0.89 
ρ
g  0.87 
ρ
R  0.61 
σε
z  0.021 
σε
g  0.07 
σε




5.2 Impulse Responses 
 
In this section I present and discuss the impulse responses of the model in order to illustrate 
the dynamic properties of the optimal fiscal policy. The interest rate is expressed in 
percentage points. Output, productivity, hours worked, the wage rate, the tax rate, tax 
revenues and government expenditures are expressed in percentage deviations from their 
steady state values. The deviations of government debt, the primary deficit, the total  deficit,. 




Interest Rate Shocks 
 
Figure 1 displays the optimal responses of the variables in the model to a 100 basis points 
increase in the interest rate. In response to a positive and persistent increase in the interest 
rate, labor demand shifts to the left on impact and its effect on hours worked depends on the 20 
slope of the labor supply an on its reaction to an interest rate innovation. Since I assumed 
GHH preferences, the labor supply is independent of the level of consumption, however, it is 
not independent of the interest rate because labor supply depends on the tax rate, and the tax 
rate is affected by interest rate shocks. In response to a positive innovation in the interest rate, 
the tax rate decreases on impact, and consequently, the labor supply shifts to the right on 
impact. Therefore, a positive innovation in the interest rate generates a reduction in the wage 
rate.  
 
Since the optimal fiscal policy smoothes tax distortions over time, the response of the tax rate 
is very small, which implies that the labor demand shifts more than the labor supply, and as 
result hours worked and output also decrease on impact. The magnitude of the fall in hours 
depends on the wage elasticity of labor demand and on the wage elasticity of labor supply 








. The lower is ν , or the higher is η , the more labor 
decreases in response to an interest rate shock.  
 
Interest rate shocks have two effects on consumption. The direct effect reduces consumption, 
because an increase in the interest rate makes future consumption cheaper. The indirect effect 
is through labor. Since GHH preferences are not separable across consumption and hours, a 
fall in hours worked makes the household reduce consumption as well in order to keep the 
marginal utility of consumption smooth over time. The sum of the two effects makes the 
response of consumption to an interest rate shock to be larger than the response of output. 
Since consumption falls more than output on impact, and government expenditures remain 
constant, the trade balance, which is given by equation (13), increases.  
 
For a given tax rate, wage income and profit income decrease. Since taxes are distortionary, a 
lower household income, and therefore, a lower tax base, induces the government to increase 
its debt, and to decrease the tax rate in order to smooth tax distortions over time. Tax 
revenues also decrease, not only because the tax rate decreases, but also because the tax base 
which includes wage income and profit income decreases. The primary deficit increases as 
well since  tax revenues decrease and government expenditures remain constant. The deficit 
which includes the primary deficit plus interest payments also increases, not only because the 
primary deficit increases but also because interest payments on debt increase as a 
consequence of the interest rate increase.  
 
Public debt responds on impact less to the shock than the other variables, but it accumulates 
over time. The responses of debt and the primary deficit to an interest rate shock have the 
same sign in the first periods. However, the response of the primary deficit changes sign after 
a few periods, because a higher debt interest will have to be serviced in the future since debt 
accumulates over time. The impulse response functions of the tax rate and tax revenues also 
change sign after a few periods in order to prevent debt from exploding in the long run. 
Moreover, the impulse response functions of public debt and the tax rate are more persistent 
than the impulse response functions of the other variables in the economy. Finally, the 
current account decreases since the economy’s net foreign asset position deteriorates. 
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 In the long-run (not shown in the diagrams) all variables converge to the steady state.  
 
The optimal response of the tax rate to an aggregate shock is given by first order condition 
(7). If we log-linearize this first order condition, we have that the optimal percentage 






























where τ  is the steady state value of the tax rate. 
 
 
Since I assumed that  1 = θ , and because we are considering interest rate shocks, the above 
equation simplifies to:  
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Interest rate shocks have two effects on the tax rate. One direct effect, and one indirect effect 
through the response of labor to interest rate shocks. The direct effect decreases the tax rate, 
however, since labor decreases, the indirect effect of the interest rate through labor will tend 
to increase the tax rate. Since the two effects go in opposite directions, the response of the tax 
rate will tend to be very small. With the benchmark parameterization, the direct effect 





Figure 2 displays the impulse response functions of the variables in the model to a 1 percent 
decrease in productivity. Since taxes are distortionary, the optimal response of the 
government is to increase its debt, and to have a small but persistent increase in the tax rate 
that will pay off the increase in the stock of debt gradually over time. Tax revenues also 
decrease, even though the tax rate has increased, since the tax base decreases significantly. 
The primary deficit increases as well since tax revenues decrease and government 
expenditures remain constant. 
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The immediate response of public debt to the shock is again small compared to the other 
variables but it accumulates over time. The responses of debt and the primary deficit to a fall 
in productivity have the same sign in the first periods. However, the response of the primary 
deficit changes sign in the future in order to pay for the additional debt service. 
 
In response to the fall in productivity, labor demand shifts to the left on impact. Since the tax 
rate increases, and labor supply is independent of consumption, labor supply also shifts to the 
left. Consequently, hours worked and output fall on impact. Labor demand shifts more than 
labor supply because the increase in the tax rate is very small, therefore, the wage rate also 
decreases. Since consumption responds less than output and government expenditures 
remains constant, the trade balance deteriorates. The current account decreases because the 
economy’s net foreign asset position deteriorates.  
 
The impulse response functions of public debt and the tax rate are again more persistent than 
the impulse response functions of the other variables in the economy. In the long-run (not 
shown in the diagrams) all variables converge to the steady state. 
 
The optimal response of the tax rate to a fall in productivity is now  given by  
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Productivity shocks have two effects on the tax rate. One direct effect, and one indirect effect 
through the response of labor to productivity shocks. The direct effect decreases the tax rate 
after a fall in productivity, however, since labor decreases, the indirect effect will tend to 
increase the tax rate. Since the two effects go in opposite directions, the response of the tax 
rate will tend to be very small. With the benchmark parameterization, the indirect effect 
dominates, so the tax rate increases after a negative productivity shock 
 
 
Government Spending Shocks 
 
Figure 3 displays the impulse response functions to a 1 percent increase in government 
spending. Given tax rates, household’s demands for consumption and leisure are unaffected 
by government spending shocks, therefore the government should finance the increase in its 
expenditure by the least distortionary combination of tax rates and government debt. 
 
In response to a positive and persistent increase in government spending the government 
finds it optimal to increase its debt, and to have a small but persistent increase in the tax rate 
that will pay off the increase in the stock of debt gradually over time. Tax revenues increase, 
but by less than the increase in government expenditure, therefore, the primary deficit 
increases. Public debt responds again on impact less to the shock than the other variables, but 
it accumulates over time. The responses of debt and the primary deficit to an increase in 23 
government spending have the same sign in the first periods. However, the response of the 
primary deficit changes sign in the future in order to pay for the additional debt service.  
Due to the fact that the tax rate increases, labor supply shifts to the left on impact, and since 
labor demand is independent of the tax rate, the wage rate increases and hours worked 
decrease. Consequently output and consumption also decrease. The trade balance 
deteriorates, but it changes sign after some periods because a higher debt interest will have to 
be serviced in the future in response to the increase in public debt. Finally, the current 
account decreases since the economy’s net foreign asset position deteriorates. In the long run 
(not shown in the diagrams) all variables converge to the steady state. 
 
 
5.3 Second Moments and Simulations 
 
The following table displays a number of sample moments of key macroeconomic variables 
under the Ramsey policy. The moments are computed as follows. First, I generate simulated 
time series of length 200 for the variables of interest, second, I HP-filter the simulated time 
series, and finally, I compute the moments. I repeat this procedure 500 times and then 
compute the average of the moments. Table 2 reports the volatility, correlations and 
autocorrelations calculated with the procedure described above. All parameters are the ones 





                                                                  Prod.Shock    Gov.Shock     Int.Shock         Output 
Variable  Std dev %  Autocorr.  Corr(x,z) Corr(x,g) Corr(x,r) Corr(x,y) 
Public debt  24.71  0.94  -0.07  0.17  0.11  -0.16 
Tax rate  2.96  0.70  -0.19  0.85  -0.19  -0.24 
Output 4.83 0.63 0.95 -0.08 -0.25  1 
Cons. 4.04 0.57 0.71 -0.22 -0.63 0.88 
Hours 3.59 0.60 0.82 -0.18 -0.50 0.95 
 
 
Some interesting facts emerge from this table: 
 
 
1)  The income tax rate and specially the public debt are quite persistent. The reason is 
that the planner finances an increase in government spending or a decrease in 
productivity partly by increasing public debt and partly by increasing the tax rate. In 
order to avoid a large distortion at the time of the shock, the planner smoothes the tax 24 
increase over time. As a consequence, the stock of public debt displays a persistent 
increase. 
 
2)  The Ramsey planner keeps distortionary taxes smooth over the business cycle; the 
standard deviation of taxes is smaller than the standard deviation of the other 
variables in the economy. The volatility of public debt serves primarily the purpose of 
smoothing the process of income tax distortions. 
 
3)  Public debt is negatively correlated with productivity and output, and positively 
correlated with government spending and the interest rate. By contrast, when agents 
have access to complete markets as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003b), the real 
value of public debt is positively correlated with productivity and output, and 
negatively correlated with government spending. In response to a positive 
government spending shock the value of real government liabilities with which the 
government leaves the period declines, and then it converges back to its steady-state 
level gradually. The Ramsey planner finances all innovations to government 
purchases with state-contingent payments from the rest of the world. In a real 
economy with only risk-free debt, however, the planner has no alternative but to 
smooth the cost of raising distortionary revenues. Therefore, public debt and the tax 
rate increase in   response to a positive government spending shock. 
 
4)  The tax rate is positively correlated with government spending, while output, 
consumption and hours are negatively correlated with government spending. By 
contrast, when agents have access to complete markets neither the Ramsey real 
allocation nor its associated income tax rate adjust in response to government 
spending shocks. 
 
5)  The negative correlation between consumption and government spending illustrates 
the limited insurance role played by non-contingent debt. If agents in a small open 
economy have access to complete markets as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003b), 
the real allocation and the optimal tax rate are uncorrelated with government spending 
shocks. Government spending shocks have only wealth effects, so agents can insure 
completely against these shocks via international financial markets. When markets 
are incomplete in a small open economy, the neutrality of government spending 
shocks disappears because agents cannot hedge against these shocks. 
 
 
6)  Output, consumption and hours worked are negatively correlated with the interest 
rate. Since firms have to borrow to pay a fraction of the wage bill at the beginning of 
the period, labor demand decreases in response to an increase in the interest rate, and 






5.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
In this section, I conduct a sensitivity analysis to evaluate how the results change when we 
vary some of the parameter values. First, I consider the elements of the model that are crucial 
for determining the effects of interest rate fluctuations on the Ramsey allocation. These 




  , and the fraction of the wage bill that 
firms have to pay in advance θ . Second, I conduct a sensitivity analysis on the parameter 
values that determine the serial correlation properties of the shocks. In particular, I evaluate 
how the results change when we consider i.i.d shocks instead of the serially correlated shocks 
of the baseline calibration. In all the cases I keep all the other parameters at their baseline 
value, and I only analyze the impulse response functions of the model to interest rate shocks. 
 
 






In this section, I evaluate how the results change when we reduce ν  from its baseline value 
of 1.6 to 1.1. Notice that the lower ν the higher is the wage elasticity of labor supply. Figure 
4 displays the impulse response functions to a 1 percentage point increase in the interest rate.  
 
As the wage elasticity of labor supply increases, hours worked and output decrease more in 
response to an interest rate shock, therefore, for a given tax rate the tax base decreases more 
than in the benchmark model.  
 
Since the government smoothes distortions over time, public debt and the deficit increase. 
Public debt accumulates more over time than in the benchmark model because a higher 
deficit needs to be financed, since the tax base decreases more in this experiment. The tax 
rate decreases less on impact to an interest rate shock, because public debt will be higher in 
the future than in the benchmark model, and consequently, higher debt interests will have to 
be paid. Therefore, the government optimally chooses not to decrease the tax rate as much as 
in the benchmark model in order to smooth tax distortions over time, and to avoid the need to 
increase the tax rate dramatically in the future.  
 
The current account also decreases more than in the benchmark model because the net 
foreign asset position deteriorates more in this experiment. The immediate response of debt is 
again small compared to the other variables, but it accumulates more in this experiment than 
in the benchmark model because the tax base decreases by more, and therefore, a higher 
deficit needs to be financed. The response of the tax rate changes sign after a few periods, 
and it also increases more in the future than in the benchmark model to prevent debt from 
exploding since debt grows more in this example. 
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The following table reports the volatility, correlations and autocorrelations of key 





Variable  Std dev %  Autocorr.  Corr(x,z) Corr(x,g) Corr(x,r) Corr(x,y) 
Public debt  30.39  0.93  -0.11  0.10  0.12  -0.24 
Tax rate  3.75  0.69  -0.55  0.72  -0.06  -0.63 
Output 8.27 0.62 0.92 -0.16 -0.33  1 
Cons. 7.55 0.60 0.81 -0.24 -0.49 0.97 
Hours 8.76 0.61 0.84 -0.21 -0.46 0.98 
 
 
The simulations shown in table 3 reveal some interesting results.  
 
1)  Increasing the wage elasticity of labor supply, increases the volatilities of all the 
variables. We can see from Table 2 that the standard deviations  increase when we 
decrease  ν . The reason is that an increase in the interest rate paid by firms on 
working capital induces a fall in hours that depends mainly on the wage elasticity of 









lower is ν  or the higher is η , the more hours worked fluctuate in response to interest 
rate shocks, and as a consequence the more output and consumption fluctuate as well. 
If the volatility of hours worked increases, then the tax base  becomes more volatile, 
consequently, the volatilities of the tax rate and of the public debt also  increase.  
 
 
2)  The correlations of the tax rate and of the public debt with the interest rate increase 
when we increase the wage elasticity of labor supply. The reason is that hours worked 
and output decrease more in response to positive interest rate shocks when we 
increase the wage elasticity of labor supply. Therefore, the tax base decreases more 
than in the benchmark model, and since the government smoothes tax distortions over 






5.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis: Fraction of the wage bill paid in advance θ  
 
In this section, I evaluate how the results change when we reduce θ  from 1 to 0.5. Now, the 
firm has to pay only half of the wage bill in advance. Figure 5 displays the impulse response 
functions to a 1 percentage point increase in the interest rate.  
 
As  θ  decreases from 1 to 0.5, the negative impact of interest rates on labor demand 
decreases, and therefore, hours worked and output decrease less than in the benchmark model 
in response to an interest rate shock. The primary deficit and the total deficit also increase 
less in response to an interest shock because tax revenues decrease less in this experiment. 
Public debt accumulates less than in the benchmark model because the negative effect of an 
interest rate shock in the economy decreases when θ  decreases. The current account also 
decreases less than in the benchmark model because the net foreign asset position 
deteriorates less in this experiment.  Finally, as θ  decreases, the volatility of the tax rate 
decreases. The tax rate decreases less on impact, and it increases less in the future.  
 
In this experiment the government can keep the tax rate smoother than in the benchmark 
model due to the fact that the impact of interest rate shocks in the economy decreases. The 
basic message of the benchmark model does not change. The government uses the optimal 
combination of  debt and tax rates consistent with competitive equilibrium that minimizes 
distortions over time. 
 
The following table 4 reports the volatility, correlations and autocorrelations of key 





Variable  Std dev %  Autocorr.  Corr(x,z) Corr(x,g) Corr(x,r) Corr(x,y) 
Public debt  24.2  0.94  -0.06  0.16  0.07  -0.13 
Tax rate  2.90  0.70  -0.18  0.89  -0.08  -0.28 
Output 4.64 0.65 0.98 -0.10 -0.13  1 
Cons. 3.65 0.60 0.78 -0.24 -0.52 0.88 






The simulations shown in table 4 also reveal some interesting results. 
 
 
1)  The standard deviations of all the variables decrease when we decreaseθ . This is 
because by reducing θ  we reduce the fraction of the wage bill that the firm has to pay 
on advance, consequently, the negative impact of interest rates on labor demand 
decreases, and therefore, hours worked and output decrease less than in the 
benchmark model in response to an interest rate shock. Since the volatility of the tax 
base decreases, the volatilities of the tax base and of the public debt decrease as well. 
 
 
2)  The absolute values of the correlations of hours worked, output and consumption with 
the interest rate decrease when we decreaseθ , because the negative impact that 
interest rates have on labor demand decreases. Since the tax base becomes less 
correlated with the interest rate, the absolute value of the correlations of public debt 




5.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis: Serial Correlation Properties of the Shocks 
 
 
In this section, I evaluate how the results change when we consider serially uncorrelated 
shocks. Table 5 reports the volatility, correlations and autocorrelations of key 
macroeconomic variables under the Ramsey policy when interest rate shocks are 
uncorrelated, table 6 shows the case of uncorrelated productivity shocks and table 7 the case 
of uncorrelated government spending shocks. 
 
 
Table 5: Uncorrelated Interest Rate Shocks  0 =
R ρ . 
 
Variable  Std dev %  Autocorr.  Corr(x,z) Corr(x,g) Corr(x,r) Corr(x,y) 
Public  debt  24.34  0.94 -0.07 0.19 0.12 -0.12 
Tax  rate  3.08 0.62 -0.18 0.84 -0.35 -0.20 
Output 4.72 0.63 0.96  -0.1  -0.2  1 
Cons. 3.42 0.53 0.84 -0.28 -0.43 0.94 
Hours 3.39 0.53 0.87 -0.21 -0.43 0.96 
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Table 6: Uncorrelated Productivity Shocks  0 =
Z ρ . 
 
Variable  Std dev %  Autocorr.  Corr(x,z) Corr(x,g) Corr(x,r) Corr(x,y) 
Public  debt  23.06  0.93 -0.09 0.19 0.13 -0.22 
Tax rate  2.95  0.7  -0.02  0.87  -0.2  -0.1 
Output 3.76 0.01 0.93 -0.15 -0.33  1 
Cons. 3.18 0.36 0.48 -0.3  -0.8 0.77 




Table 7: Uncorrelated Government Spending Shocks  0 =
g ρ . 
 
Variable  Std dev %  Autocorr.  Corr(x,z) Corr(x,g) Corr(x,r) Corr(x,y) 
Public  debt  18.73 0.9 -0.09 0.19 0.16 -0.16 
Tax  rate  1.25 0.69 -0.49 0.17 -0.47 -0.38 
Output 4.87 0.64 0.97 -0.01 -0.23  1 
Cons. 3.93 0.56 0.75 -0.01 -0.64 0.89 
Hours 3.53 0.6 0.86 -0.01  -0.49 0.96 
 
 
The moments in tables 5, 6 and 7 reveal the same result as before: the optimal fiscal policy 
smoothes tax distortions over time. Public debt is very persistent irrespective of the degree of 
autocorrelation of the underlying shocks.  
 
The results also show that the income tax rate is quite persistent independently of the 
assumed processes for the shocks generating aggregate fluctuations; this reflects the 
planner’s desire to smooth the cost of raising taxes over time. The planner finances any 
innovation to government purchases or to the tax base partly by increasing public debt and 
partly by increasing the tax rate. Therefore, public debt plays an important role as a shock 




I have characterized the properties of optimal fiscal policy in a small open economy where 
interest rates, government spending and productivity are stochastic, taxes are distortionary 
and markets are incomplete. This paper provides a new framework to analyze optimal fiscal 
policy in small open emerging economies, and extends the existing literature on optimal 
fiscal policy by studying the case of incomplete markets in a small open economy under 
uncertainty and distortionary taxation.  
 
The main contributions of the paper are the following. First, I solve the Ramsey problem for 
a small open economy with incomplete markets and stochastic interest rates, government 
spending and productivity. I show that if we restrict the agents in a small open economy to 
buy and sell only one-period non-contingent real bonds, the Ramsey planner is confronted 
with stochastic sequences of implementability constraints that arise from the requirement that 
the debt be risk-free. Since conditional expectations of future variables appear in these 
implementability constraints, the Ramsey problem is not recursive. However, I show that is 
possible to recover a recursive formulation using the recursive contracts approach of Marcet 
and Marimon (1998). 
 
Second, I show that the optimal fiscal policy consists in smoothing tax distortions over time. 
The income tax rate, and specially the public debt are very persistent irrespective of the 
degree of autocorrelation of the processes for the shocks generating aggregate fluctuations. 
This reflects the planner’s desire to smooth the cost of raising taxes over time. The Ramsey 
planner finances an increase in government spending or a decrease in productivity partly by 
increasing debt and partly by increasing the tax rate. In order to avoid a large distortion at the 
time of the shock, the planner smoothes the tax increase over time. As a consequence, the 
stock of public debt displays a persistent increase. Debt plays in this model an important role 
as a shock absorber. After a positive innovation in the interest rate or in government 
spending, or after negative innovation in productivity, the level of public debt and the 
primary deficit increase. Government debt responds on impact less than the other variables, 
but it accumulates over time, and displays the most persistent impulse response function. The 
responses of debt and the primary deficit have the same sign in the first periods. However, 
the response of the primary deficit changes sign after a few periods, because a higher debt 
interest will have to be serviced in the future in response to an increase in debt today. Finally, 
I show that debt shows more persistence than the shock processes irrespective of the degree 
of autocorrelation of the underlying shocks. 
 
By contrast, if agents in a small open economy have access to complete markets as in 
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003b), the real allocation and the optimal tax rate are 
uncorrelated with government spending shocks. Government spending shocks have only 
wealth effects, so agents can insure completely against these shocks via international 
financial markets. When markets are incomplete in a small open economy, the neutrality of 
government spending shocks disappears because agents cannot hedge against these shocks.  
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In an economy with complete markets, the optimal fiscal policy completely smoothes tax 
distortions over time and across states of nature. Moreover, under complete markets debt and 
taxes are time invariant functions of the shocks affecting the economy, and hence they inherit 
the serial correlation properties of { } t s , so they have the same persistence than other 
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Proof of Proposition 1 
 
Proposition 1: Given initial conditions  1 1, − − b d , and exogenous stochastic processes for 
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if and only if they satisfy (5), (7),  (10), (11), (15), (6), (8), (12). 
 
 
First, I show that state-contingent plans  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { }
∞
=0 , , , t
t t t t s b s d s h s c  satisfying (5), (7),  (10), 
(11), (15), (6), (8), and (12) also satisfy (16), (17), (6), (8), (12). 
 
 
To obtain (16), solve (10) for  ( )
t s w , (15) for  ( )
t s Π  and (7) for  ( )
t s τ . Then, use the resulting 
expressions to eliminate  ( )
t s w ,  ( )
t s Π  and  ( )
t s τ  from (5). The resulting equation is (16).  
 
To obtain (17), substitute (5) into (11), then, solve (10) for  ( )
t s w , and (15) for  ( )
t s Π , and 
use the resulting expressions to eliminate  ( )
t s w ,  ( )
t s Π   from this equation. The resulting 
expression is (17). 
 
Now, it must be shown that if  state-contingent plans  ( ) ( ) ( )() { }
∞
=0 , , , t
t t t t s b s d s h s c  satisfy (6), 
(8), (12), (16) and (17), then they are also consistent with (5), (7), (10), (11), (15), (6), (8), 
(12).  
 
Set  ( )
t s w  such that (10) holds,  ( )
t s τ  such that (7) holds and  ( )
t s Π  such that (15) holds. 
Therefore, (7), (10) and (15) are satisfied by construction.  35 
 
Using the definitions of  ( )
t s w ,  ( )
t s Π  and  ( )
t s τ  in (16), we can recover (5).   
 
Then, use the definitions of  ( )
t s w ,  ( )
t s Π  and  ( )
t s τ  in (16), and the definitions of   ( )
t s w , 
( )








The first order conditions of the Ramsey problem are given by: 
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We also have the transversality conditions 
 
 












































1 1, − − b d  given and  0 1 = − γ  
 
 
Let’s denote the vector of endogenous state variables of the optimal problem by 
[] ′ = − − − − 1 1 1 1 , , t t t t b d x γ . The vector of all other endogenous variables is denoted by   
[] ′ = t t t t t h c a φ λ , , , , and the vector of exogenous state variables by  [] ′ = t t t t g R z s , , . 
Then, the first order conditions that characterize the optimal fiscal policy can be represented 
as a system of equations of the form: 
 
 
() 0 , , , 1 = − t t t t s a x x G  
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() [] 0 , , , , , , 1 1 1 1 = + + − + t t t t t t t t s s a a x x x V E  
 
 
The first set is formed by the deterministic equations (18), (19), (20) and (21), and the second 
set is formed by the expectational equations (22), (23) and (24). 
 
The first order conditions of the Ramsey problem cannot be solved analytically, therefore, I 
will compute the equilibrium dynamics by solving a log-linear approximation to the Ramsey 
planner’s optimality conditions. 
 
The computational approach involves two steps. First, we compute the non-stochastic steady 
state which is given by  () 0 , , , = s a x x G , and  ( ) 0 , , , , , , = s s a a x x x V .  
 
Second, we log-linearize the above system of equations around the non-stochastic steady 
state and calculate the local dynamic behavior of the endogenous variables given the 
specified law of motion for the exogenous state variables. 
 
The log-linearized equilibrium conditions can be written in the following form 
 
 
(28)   0 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 0 0 1 1 = + + + − t t t t o s a x x δ β α α  
 
 
(29)    [] 0 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 4 3 1 2 = + + + + + + + + − + t t t t t t t t s s a a x x x E δ δ β β α α α  
 
 
(30)      1 1 ˆ ˆ + + + Φ = t t t s s ε ,   [ ] 0 1 = + t t E ε  
 
 
where the “hated” variables represent percentage deviations from the steady state, and  the 
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We seek processes {} t t a x ˆ , ˆ  that are consistent with (28), (29), (30) for all {} t t s x ˆ , ˆ 1 − , with the 
initial conditions, and with the transversality conditions. That is, we are seeking a recursive 
equilibrium law of motion of the form 
 
 
t t t s B x A x ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 + = −  
 
t t t s D x C a ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 + = −  
 
1 1 ˆ ˆ + + + Φ = t t t s s ε  
 
 
Therefore, we need to solve for matrices A, B, C, D,  so that the equilibrium described by 






























Figure 1: Impulse Responses to an Interest Rate Shock.  
 


























































































































































































































































































































Figure 4: Impulses Responses to an Interest Rate Shock,  1 . 1 = ν  
 




























































































































































Figure 5: Impulses Responses to an Interest Rate Shock,  5 . 0 = θ  
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